We study algorithms for solving one-and two-player stochastic games with perfect information, by modeling a game as a finite, possibly cyclic graph. We analyze a family of jeopardy stochastic games, prove the existence and uniqueness of optimal solutions, and give approximation algorithms to solve them by incorporating Newton's method into retrograde analysis. Examples of jeopardy stochastic games include Can't Stop, Pig, and some variants. Results of experiments on small versions of the game Can't Stop are presented.
INTRODUCTION
Retrograde analysis was initially introduced by Ströhlein (1970) . It is a bottom-up process for deterministic, finite, two-player zero-sum games with perfect information to compute the game-theoretic values of positions, based on which an optimal playing strategy can be obtained. It has been successfully applied to building endgame databases of checkers (Lake, Schaeffer, and Lu, 1994; Schaeffer et al., 2004) , chess (Thompson, 1986; Thompson, 1996) , and Chinese chess (Fang, 2005a; Fang, 2005b; Wu and Beal, 2001) . It also played a crucial role in solving Nine Men's Morris (Gasser, 1996) and Kalah (Irving, Donkers, and Uiterwijk, 2000) . A prominent success of parallel retrograde analysis was solving Awari (Romein and Bal, 2003) .
This work considers stochastic games with perfect information, which have received less attention than the deterministic games, although the game-theoretic values of positions are also clearly defined. Reinforcement learning techniques (Sutton and Barto, 1998) are often used to tackle stochastic games, such as the study of two-player value iteration by Littman (1994) . In some games like Yahtzee, the dependencies between positions are acyclic, which guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution. Glenn (2006) and Woodward (2003) solved one-player Yahtzee by backward induction. In addition, a recent study was on computer strategies for solitaire Yahtzee (Glenn, 2007a) .
For games with cyclic graph representations, such as Backgamma, Can't Stop, and Pig, value iteration has been applied to approximate the optimal solutions (Bellman, 1957; Sutton and Barto, 1998) . Sconyers (2003) built 15×15 bear-off databases of Backgammon that include all positions in Hypergammon. Neller and Presser (2004) solved two-player Pig. In both cases, the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution are not formally proved, although convergence of value iteration in practice implies the existence of the solution. In addition to the effort for the optimal playing strategy, Keller (1998) In this paper we analyze a family of stochastic games, called jeopardy games. In a jeopardy game, dice or a randomizing device are used to obtain a value. Depending on the value and the current position a player makes a choice of moves toward the goal, and then decide to either (1) stop and end the turn with the progress banked, or (2) continue rolling dice and make a further progress. Some dice values, possibly depending on the positions, end the player's turn automatically and the player loses the whole progress of the current turn. Therefore, the is to minimize the number of turns to reach the goal. Therefore, g(u) adds one for each turn. More precisely, g(u) = 1, if u is the starting position for a turn, 0, otherwise.
For the optimal playing strategy, we minimize the expected penalty. Therefore, for all non-terminal move positions v ∈ V , f (v) = min{f (u) : (v, u) ∈ E}.
A terminal vertex indicates the end of a game. We assume all terminal vertices, denoted by z, are roll positions (in U ) with f (z) = g(z). For example, in one-player Can't Stop, a terminal vertex z is reached when the player completes three columns, and therefore no additional rolling of dice is required, so f (z) = g(z) = 0.
A position value function f satisfying both conditions (1) and (2) is called a solution. A game is solved if a solution is obtained.
This model of one-player stochastic games is equivalent to a Markov decision process without cumulative reward discount, explained as follows. A Markov decision process (MDP) consists of a state spaceV , an action spaceÂ, a probability functionp :V ×Â×V → [0, 1], and an immediate reward functionĝ :V ×Â → R, wherep(v 1 , a, v 2 ) is the probability that in state v 1 ∈V action a ∈Â will lead to the next state v 2 ∈V , andĝ(v 1 , a) is the immediate reward obtained by action a in state v 1 . A policy π :V →Â is a function that maps the current state observed by an agent to an action. Starting from a state v 0 ∈V and following a policy π an agent may travel across states v 0 , v 1 , v 2 , . . ., and obtain the cumulative reward defined byĝ(v 0 , π(v 0 )) + γĝ(v 1 , π(v 1 )) + γ 2ĝ (v 1 , π(v 1 )) + · · · , where 0 ≤ γ < 1 is the discount rate. The process terminates when the agent enters a state v satisfying ∀v ′ ∈V , p (v, π(v) , v ′ ) = 0. Due to random factors we consider the expected cumulative rewardf (v, π) an agent following policy π will receive in state v. It can be expressed by the recurrence relation
which is called the Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957 ). An optimal policy π * maximizes the expected cumulative reward and therefore satisfies the recurrence relation
Now we show the equivalence of our one-player model and the MDP without cumulative reward discount. The state spaceV in a MDP is our set of move positions V . We defineÛ = {(v, a) : v ∈V , a ∈Â} and E = { (v, (v, a) ) : v ∈V , (v, a) ∈Û} ∪ {((v, a), v ′ ) :p(v, a, v ′ ) > 0} in a MDP that correspond to our set of roll positions U and edge set E. Each probabilityp (v, a, v ′ ) > 0 with u ′ = (v, a) ∈ U ′ in the MDP corresponds to our p((u ′ , v ′ )). The immediate rewardĝ(v, a) with u ′ = (v, a) ∈ U ′ is our negated step penalty −g(u ′ ). Finally, our (minimized) expected penalty f (v), v ∈ V defined by (1) and (2) is the negated optimal expected reward −f (v, π * ) defined by (3) and (4) in a MDP but with γ = 1. Therefore, solving a one-player stochastic game is equivalent to the optimal control of a MDP without future reward discount. Also note that in MDP 'agent' and 'policy' are our 'player' and 'playing strategy', respectively. Figure 1 gives an example that simulates the last stage of a one-player jeopardy stochastic game. Here, g(u 1 ) = 1, g(u 2 ) = g(u 3 ) = 0, p((u 1 , v 1 )) = 1, and p((u 2 , v 2 )) = p((u 2 , v 3 )) = 0.5. A turn begins at position u 1 . At position u 2 , the first player has 50% probability of reaching the goal, and a 50% chance of falling back to u 1 . By (1) and (2),
The unique solution is f (u 1 ) = f (v 2 ) = 2 and f (u 2 ) = f (v 1 ) = 1.
Suppose we are given a one-player game graph G and its associated function g. First, we investigate the existence and uniqueness of the solution (i.e., a position value function f that satisfies both conditions (1) and (2)). Second, we design an efficient algorithm to solve it, assuming a solution exists.
Figure 1: An example of game graph G = (U, V, E) with a unique solution.
One-Player Games without Cycles
For games with acyclic game graphs, such as Yahtzee, the bottom-up retrograde process to compute the gametheoretic values of positions is clear. We first associate the terminal positions with their position values, and then propagate the information iteratively back to the predecessors until the game-theoretic values of all positions are obtained. The pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1. It can also be applied to constructing the perfect Backgammon bear-off databases with no piece on the bar.
Algorithm 1 A retrograde algorithm to solve a one-player stochastic game G = (U, V, E) without cycles. Require: G = (U, V, E) is acyclic. Ensure: Program terminates with (1) and (2) satisfied.
∀u ∈ U , f (u) ← g(u), the step penalty.
Consider Algorithm 1. We say a vertex is determined if its position value is known. By (1) and (2), a non-terminal vertex cannot be determined until all its children are determined. The sets S 1 and S 2 store all determined but not yet propagated vertices. A vertex is removed from them after it is propagated. The backward induction is guaranteed to terminate with all position values determined when it is applied to a game graph without cycles. See Glenn, Fang, and Kruskal (2007b) for details. The optimal playing strategy is clear: in position v we make the move (v, u) with the minimum f (u).
Note that in Algorithm 1, an edge (u, v) can be visited as many times as the out-degree of u because of (*) and (**). The efficiency can be improved as follows. We associate each vertex with a number of undetermined children, and decrease the value by one whenever a child is determined. A vertex is determined after the number is decreased down to zero. As a result, each edge is visited only once and the algorithm is linear. This is called the children counting strategy. For games like Yahtzee, the level of each vertex (the longest distance to the terminal vertices) is known a priori. Therefore, we can compute the position values level by level. Each edge is visited only once without counting the children.
One-Player Games with Cyclic Dependencies
We showed in Subsection 2.1 that our one-player game model is equivalent to a Markov decision process (MDP) without future reward discount. Value iteration can be used to approximate the optimal policy of a MDP. The convergence, which implies a solution, is guaranteed with a reward discount rate 0 ≤ γ < 1. The proof relies on γ being the contraction rate of global error bound (see, e.g., Mitchell (1997) , section 13). In our model there is no future award discount (i.e., γ = 1). Therefore, if a game graph is cyclic, a solution may not exist.
A well-designed game is expected to have a unique solution. Here we show that the existence and uniqueness of solution is guaranteed for all one-player jeopardy stochastic games, including one-player Can't Stop and Pig. In the graph representation of such a game, each strongly connected component has a critical position, called an anchor. When a dice roll results in no legal move, the game goes back to the anchor, causing a cycle.
We begin with a condition under which a solution exists and is unique in Lemma 1. The proof uses the standard fixed point theorem (see, e.g., Rosenlicht (1968) , chapter 8). The utilization of fixed point theorems in game theory is not new. The most well-known success is the proof of the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951) , the seminal work leading to the Nobel prize in economic sciences in 1994.
Theorem 1 (Fixed Point Theorem) If a continuous function
f : R → R satisfies f (x) ∈ [a, b] for all x ∈ [a, b], then f has a fixed point in [a, b] (i.e., f (c) = c for some c ∈ [a, b]). Lemma 1 A cyclic game graph G = (U, V, E) has a solution if, 1. For all u ∈ U , g(u) ≥ 0.
For each non-terminal vertex u, there is a path from u to a terminal vertex.
3. There exists some w ∈ U such that the graph is acyclic after removing the outgoing edges of w.
In addition, if the vertex w in condition 3 satisfies g(w) > 0, then the solution is unique with all position values non-negative.
Proof LetĜ = (U, V,Ê) be the graph obtained by removing all of the outgoing edges from w in G (i.e.,
By condition 3,Ĝ = (U, V,Ê) is acyclic. All the terminal vertices other than w inĜ are also terminal in G. Let x be the estimated position value of w. We can solveĜ by Algorithm 1. However, we propagate in terms of x (i.e., treat x as a variable during propagation), though we know the value of x. For example, assuming x = 6, we write min{ 1 2 x, 1 3 x + 2} = 1 2 x instead of 3. We usê f (x, y) to denote the position value of y ∈ U ∪ V ofĜ in terms of x. At the end of Algorithm 1, we computê f (x, w) with edges in E −Ê in terms of x by (1). The values off (x, y) for all y ∈ U ∪ V constitute a solution to G, if and only iff (x, w) equals x in value. The main theme of this proof is to discuss the existence and uniqueness of x * satisfyingf (x * , w) = x * .
Iteratively applying (1) and (2), allf (x, y) for y ∈ U ∪ V are in the form ax + b, where 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. We are particularly concerned withf (x, w). Letf (x, w) = a(x)x + b(x), where a(x) and b(x) are real functions of x. By (1) and (2), it is not hard to see that a(x) is non-increasing, b(x) is non-decreasing, and both a(x) and b(x) are piecewise constant. Hencef (x, w) is piecewise linear, continuous and non-decreasing in terms of x.
By condition 2, a(x) < 1 for x large enough. Since a(x) is non-increasing and a(x) < 1 for x large enough, f (x) < x for x large enough. By Theorem 1, there exists
Now we discuss the uniqueness of the solution. By condition 1,
is piecewise linear and continuous with 0 ≤ a(x) ≤ 1 for x ∈ R. Therefore, x ≤ 0 impliesf (x, w) > x. Hence the smallest solution x * tof (x, w) = x is greater than zero. Sincef (0, w) > 0 and a(x) is non-increasing, a(x * ) < 1 and thereforef (x, w) < x for x > x * . We conclude that the additional condition g(w) > 0 guarantees the solution x * > 0 tof (x, w) = x is unique. With the position value x * of the anchor w, we repeatedly apply (1) and (2) and obtain all position values being non-negative. The solution to the game graph G is unique since x * is unique. 2
We illustrate an example with no solution. Consider the game graph in Figure 2 and assume g(u 2 ) = 0. It satisfies all the conditions in Lemma 1 except that g(
we obtain x = min{0, x} − 1 which has no solution.
The interpretation is that the player would stay in the loop forever to gain the unlimited award (negative-valued penalty). It is easy to construct a game graph G = (U, V, E) with infinitely many solutions. For example, a ring with u∈U g(u) = 0. Another example is the game graph in Figure 2 with g(u 2 ) = 1. Let f (u 1 ) = x. By propagation, we are to solve x = min{0, x}, which has infinitely many solutions x ≤ 0. In such games the game-theoretic values of positions cannot be uniquely fixed due to cyclic dependencies.
Consider the strongly connected components of the game graph of one-player Can't Stop. Each strongly connected component consists of all the positions with a certain placement of the squares and various placements of the at most three markers. The roll position with no marker is the anchor of the component. When left without a legal move, the game goes back to the anchor, and results in a cycle. The outgoing edges of each non-terminal component lead to the anchors in the supporting components. The terminal components are those in which the player has won three columns. Each terminal component has only one vertex with position value 0. Note that all one-player jeopardy stochastic games have the same structure in their graph representations. All strongly connected components satisfy the precondition of Lemma 1.
Theorem 2 All one-player games in the family of jeopardy stochastic games have unique solutions.
Proof The proof is by finite induction. We split the game graph of a one-player jeopardy stochastic game into strongly connected components, and consider the components in bottom-up order.
Given a non-terminal component with the anchors in its supporting components having position values nonnegative and uniquely determined, we consider the subgraph induced by the component and the anchors in its supporting components. This subgraph satisfies the precondition in Lemma 1, where the terminal positions are the anchors in the supporting components. Therefore, it has a unique solution with all position values non-negative. By induction, a unique solution is guaranteed for a one-player jeopardy stochastic game. 2
TWO-PLAYER CAN'T STOP

Problem Formulation
A two-player, stochastic game with perfect information and a finite number of positions can be represented as a directed, four-partite
A position is a vertex w ∈ U ∪Ū ∪ V ∪V . Positions in U ∪ V represent positions where it is player one's turn; positions inŪ ∪V indicate player two's turn. A roll position is a vertex u ∈ U ∪Ū. A move position is a vertex v ∈ V ∪V .
For each non-terminal roll position u, a dice roll is a random event. The weight 0 < p ((u, v) ) ≤ 1 indicates the probability that the game in roll position u will change into move position v. So,
A move (v, u) (from a move position to a roll position) is a deterministic choice made by a player.
As in the one-player model, a turn consists of a sequence of partial turns, each of which is a dice roll followed by a move. A partial turn (u 1 , u 2 ) (from roll position u 1 to roll position u 2 ) consists of a random event followed by a move. It is represented by a pair of edges
We associate each position with a real number representing the expected game score that the first player achieves with optimal play, denoted by a function f : U ∪Ū ∪ V ∪V → R. The function f (u) indicates the probability that the first player will win the game. For zero-sum games such as two-player Can't Stop and Pig, the probability that the second player wins is 1 − f (u). For any terminal position z ∈ U ∪Ū , f (z) = 1 if the first player wins, and f (z) = 0 if the first player loses. For two-player Yahtzee, a game may end in a draw. In this case we can set f (z) = 0.5.
The function f satisfies that for all (non-terminal) roll positions u ∈ U ∪Ū ,
In optimal play the first player maximizes f and the second player minimizes f . Therefore, for all non-terminal move positions v ∈ V ∪V ,
For all positions w ∈ U ∪Ū ∪ V ∪V , f (w) is also called the position value of w.
A position value function f satisfying both conditions (5) and (6) is called a solution. A game is solved if a solution is obtained. We illustrate an example with Figure 3 . We have
The two terminal vertices are u 2 andū 2 with f (u 2 ) = g(u 2 ) = 1 and f (ū 2 ) = g(ū 2 ) = 0, respectively. This example simulates the last stage of a two-player jeopardy stochastic game. At position u 1 , the first player has 50% chance of winning the game immediately, and a 50% chance of being unable to advance and therefore making no progress at this turn. The second player is in the same situation at positionū 1 . By (5) and (6),
Two-Player Games without Cycles
Algorithm 1 can be modified easily to work for two-player game graphs. There are few substantive changes: in the initialization phase we set f (u) = 0 for roll positions u because there is no longer a step penalty function g; and in the propagation phase we maximize if v ∈ V and minimize if v ∈V when examining an edge (v, u) . This necessitates another change in the initialization phase: we set f (v) to −∞ if v ∈ V and to ∞ if v ∈V . The result is Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 A retrograde algorithm to solve a two-player stochastic game G = (U, V,Ū ,V , E) without cycles.
Ensure: Program terminates with (5) and (6) 
Algorithm 2 is indeed a retrograde process in bottom-up order. It solves a given two-player game graph without cycles within a finite number of iterations. See Glenn, Fang, and Kruskal (2007c) for further discussions. Note that an edge (u, v) can be visited as many times as the out-degree of u because of (*) and (**). With the children counting strategy described in Subsection 2.2, we need to visit each edge only once. As a result, the algorithm is linear.
Two-Player Games with Cyclic Dependencies
Value iteration can be applied to solving Markov games (Littman, 1994) , where the reward discount factor guarantees the convergence which implies a solution. However, in our two-player model there is no future award discount. Therefore, a solution is not guaranteed if a cycle is present. In the case of dice game Pig, value iteration happens to converge (Neller and Presser, 2004 , page 29), so a solution exists.
A well-designed game is expected to have a unique solution. Here we prove the existence and uniqueness of a solution for all two-players jeopardy stochastic games. In the graph representation of such a game, each strongly connected component has two critical positions, called anchors. When a dice roll results in no legal move, the game goes back to one of the two anchors, leading to a cycle.
We begin with a condition under which a solution for a two-player cyclic game exists and is unique in Lemma 2. The proof uses the Fixed Point Theorem again. 2. There exist w 1 ∈ U and w 2 ∈Ū such that all edges from G 1 to G 2 end at w 2 , and all edges from G 2 to G 1 end at w 1 . In other words, 
Lemma 2 Given a cyclic two-player game graph
be the induced bipartite subgraphs of G. By condition 1,Ĝ 1 andĜ 2 are acyclic. ConsiderĜ 1 . All the terminal vertices inĜ 1 other than w 2 are also terminal in G. If we know the position value of w 2 , then the solution toĜ 1 can be uniquely determined sinceĜ 1 is acyclic. Given the estimated position value y of w 2 , we can determine the positions values ofĜ 1 by Algorithm 1. Denote byf 1 (y, w) the position value of w ∈ U ∪ V that depends on y. Likewise, given x as the estimated position value of w 1 , we denote byf 2 (x,w) the position value ofw ∈Ū ∪V . The values off 1 (y, w) for w ∈ U ∪ V and f 2 (x,w) forw ∈Ū ∪V constitute a solution to G, if and only iff 1 (y, w 1 ) = x andf 2 (x, w 2 ) = y. The main theme of this proof is to discuss the existence and uniqueness of x * , y
Condition 3 states that all terminal position values are in [0, 1]. Iteratively applying (5) and (6),
is a continuous function of y. By Theorem 1, there exists y * ∈ [0, 1] such thatf 2 (f 1 (y * , w 1 ), w 2 ) = y * . Iteratively applying (5) and (6) again, the position values
Now we investigate the uniqueness of the solution. ConsiderĜ 1 , whose solution can be obtained by propagation that depends on y, the position value of w 2 . For convenience of discussion, we propagate in terms of y (i.e., treat y as a variable during the propagation), even though we know the value of y. For example, assuming y = 1 2 , we write max{ (5) and (6), all propagated values of u ∈ U ∪ V are in the form ay + b, which represents the local function values off 1 (y, u). Condition 3 gives us a bound on a, b. By finite induction, a, b are non-negative and a + b ≤ 1 for y ∈ [0, 1]. (It is still true that 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 for y ∈ R.) We are particularly concerned withf 1 (y, w 1 ). Analysis above shows thatf 1 (y, w 1 ) in terms of y is piecewise linear, continuous and non-decreasing with the slope of each line segment in [0, 1], and so isf 2 (x, w 2 ) in terms of x by a similar discussion. These properties are inherited by the composite functionf 2 (f 1 (y, w 1 ), w 2 ). Now we claim that the additional conditions 4 and 5 guarantee that the slope of each line segment off 1 (y, u) is less than 1 for u ∈ U . We prove our claim by induction. Note thatĜ 1 is bipartite and acyclic. We consider the positions level by level in bottom-up order as in Algorithm 2, but here we propagate in terms of y. Our claim is clearly true for terminal positions, which are independent of y so the slope is zero. Given v ∈ V , if (v, w 2 ) ∈ E, we getf 1 (y, v) = y by condition 5. Otherwise,f 1 (y, v) has slope less than 1 by (6) and the assumption that f 1 (y, u) has slope less than 1 for u ∈ U . Given u ∈ U , conditions 4 and 5 imply that it has a child v such that (v, w 2 ) / ∈ E. By (5),f 1 (y, u) has slope less than 1. The proof of our claim is completed by finite induction.
Since w 1 ∈ U , our claim implies that each line segment off 1 (y, w 1 ) has slope less than 1 if the additional conditions 4 and 5 also hold. Therefore, the slope of each line segment of the continuous functionf 2 (f 1 (y, w 1 ), w 2 ) is also less than 1. This guarantees the uniqueness of the solution in [0, 1] tof 2 (f 1 (y, w 1 ), w 2 ) = y. 2
Here we illustrate an example with infinitely many solutions in Figure 4 , where U = {u 1 , u 2 }, V = {v 1 }, U{ū 1 ,ū 2 }, andV = {v 1 }. This graph satisfies conditions 1 to 4 in Lemma 2. However, condition 5 does not hold. Denote f (u 2 ) = a, f (ū 2 ) = b and f (ū 1 ) = y. Iteratively applying (5) and (6), we are to solve min{max{a, y}, b} = y for y. If a < b, it has infinitely many solutions f (u 1 ) = f (v 1 ) = f (ū 1 ) = f (v 1 ) = y for a < y < b. On the other hand, if a ≥ b, the solution, f (u 1 ) = f (v 1 ) = a and f (ū 1 ) = f (v 1 ) = b, is unique. Consider the strongly connected components of the game graph of two-player Can't Stop. Each strongly connected component consists of all the positions with a certain placement of the squares and various placement of the at most three markers for the player on the move. The two roll positions with no marker are the anchors of the component. In one of them it is the turn of the first player, whereas in the other it is the second player to move. When left without a legal move, the game goes back to one of the two anchors, and results in a cycle. The outgoing edges of each non-terminal component lead to the anchors in the supporting components. The terminal components are those in which some player has won the game (by completing three columns). Each terminal component has only one vertex with position value 1 (if the first player wins) or 0 (if the second player wins). Note that all two-player jeopardy stochastic games have the same structure in their graph representations. All strongly connected components satisfy the precondition of Lemma 2. Proof The proof is by finite induction. We split the game graph of a two-player jeopardy stochastic game into strongly connected components, and consider the components in bottom-up order. 
RETROGRADE APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS
Value Iteration
If we apply Algorithms 1 and 2 to one-and two-player stochastic games with cyclic dependencies, then the positions in the cycles cannot be determined. Value iteration (Bellman, 1957; Sutton and Barto, 1998) can be used to approximate the solutions of cyclic games. For example it has been successfully applied to solving twoplayer Pig (Neller and Presser, 2004) . A high-level description of value iteration for stochastic games is given in Algorithm 3.
Two schemes to improve efficiency are described as follows. First, instead of applying Algorithm 3 to the whole game graph, we divide it into strongly connected components, and solve the components in bottom-up order. This Algorithm 3 Value iteration for one-and two-player stochastic games with cyclic dependencies.
{Given a stochastic game graph with the set of positions denoted by V , and tolerance ǫ > 0.} For all terminal positions z ∈ V , initialize f (z) to its value.
Update f (v) with the current estimated position values of it children by (1), (2), (5), or (6). δ ← max{δ, |t − f (v)|} end for until δ < ǫ is a general scheme not limited to value iteration. Second, we can visit the vertices in the for loop (*) in the order according to their dependencies. This scheme is incorporated in the naive algorithms in Glenn et al. (2007b) and Glenn et al. (2007c) for Can't Stop.
Value iteration is known for its slow linear convergence (see, e.g., Mitchell (1997) , section 13). It is possible to improve the convergence by taking advantage of the particular structure of a game graph, if any, in algorithm design. We call a subset of vertices in a cyclic graph anchors if removing them results in an acyclic subgraph. In the following subsection we present our retrograde approximation algorithms by incorporating Newton's method into retrograde analysis. They are particularly useful for stochastic games with only a few anchors in each strongly connected component.
Efficient Retrograde Approximation Algorithms
In some games, such as those in the family of jeopardy stochastic games, the number of anchors in each strongly connected component of the game graphs is small. An observation makes it possible to design efficient algorithms to compute the solutions.
The proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 reveal that we can propagate in terms of position value x of the anchor (i.e., treat x as a variable), though we know the value of x. For example, assuming x = 6, we write min{ 1 2 x, 1 3 x+2} = 1 2 x instead of 3. Then not only the estimated position values but also the function slopes (derivatives) are passed during propagation. We equate the linear function propagated back to the anchor with variable x and solve it for the estimated position value of the anchor in next iteration.
The method just described is equivalent to solvingf (x, w) = x (one-player game) orf 1 (y, w 1 ) = x and f 2 (x, w 2 ) = y (two-player game) by Newton's method, which is well-known for its fast convergence (see, e.g., Dennis and Schnabel (1996) , chapter 5). In our case, the functionsf (x, w) (one-player game), andf 1 (y, w 1 ) andf 2 (x, w 2 ) (two-player game) are piecewise linear. Hence Newton's method can reach the solution in a finite number of iterations. In practice, however, rounding errors may create minor inaccuracy. The pseudocode is given in Algorithm 4 for one-player games and in Algorithm 5 for two-player games.
Algorithm 4 An efficient algorithm to solve a one-player stochastic game graph with one anchor. Require: G = (U, V, E) satisfies the precondition in Lemma 1 with an anchor w ∈ U . Ensure:f converges to the solution to G in the rate of Newton's method.
⊲ Subsection 4.3 Let x denote the estimate for position value of anchor w.
⊲ Estimation Phase Obtain the acyclic graphĜ = (U, V,Ê) by removing the outgoing edges of w. repeat ⊲ Approximation Phase SolveĜ (in terms of x) with the current estimate x for w by Algorithm 1. Computef (x, w) with E −Ê by (5) in terms of x. Denote the result by ax + b.
An example of applying Algorithm 4 is illustrated with the game graph in Figure 1 as follows. We treat u 1 as w in Lemma 1, and let x be the initial estimate of the position value of u 1 . Thenf (x, v 2 ) = x,f (x, v 1 ) =f (x, u 2 ) = 1 2 x, andf (x, u 1 ) = 1 2 x + 1. Solving 1 2 x + 1 = x, we obtain x = 2, which is the exact position value of u 1 .
Algorithm 5 An efficient algorithm to solve a two-player stochastic game graph with two anchors. Require: G = (U, V,Ū ,V , E) satisfies the precondition in Lemma 2 with two anchors w 1 ∈ U and w 2 ∈Ū . Ensure:f 1 andf 2 converge to the solution to G in the rate of Newton's method.
⊲ Subsection 4.3 Denote the induced acyclic subgraphsĜ 1 = (U ∪ {w 2 }, V, E 1 ) andĜ 2 = (Ū ∪ {w 1 },V , E 2 ) as in Lemma 2. Estimate the position values of anchors w 1 ∈ U and w 2 ∈Ū, denoted by x and y.
⊲ Estimation Phase repeat ⊲ Approximation phase SolveĜ 1 in terms of the current estimate y for w 2 by Algorithm 1.
⊲ (*) Denote the linear segment off 1 (y, w 1 ) by a 1 y + b 1 . SolveĜ 2 in terms of the current estimate x for w 1 by Algorithm 1.
⊲ (**) Denote the linear segment off 2 (x, w 2 ) by a 2 x + b 2 . Solve x = a 1 y + b 1 and y = a 2 x + b 2 for the next estimates x and y. until the values of x and y cannot be longer unchanged.
An example of applying Algorithm 5 is illustrated with the game graph in Figure 3 as follows. We treat u 1 as w 1 andū 1 as w 2 in Lemma 2, and let x and y be the initial estimate of the position values of u 1 andū 1 , respectively. Thenf 1 (y, u 1 ) = In both small examples shown above, we obtain the solution by one iteration. In practice, multiple iterations are expected to reach the solution. In the estimation phase of both Algorithms 4 and 5, the better the initial estimated position value(s) of the anchor(s), the fewer steps are needed to reach the solution. Careful initialization may improve the convergence.
For a two-player game graph satisfying the precondition in Lemma 2, the graphsĜ 1 andĜ 2 are disjoint except w 1 and w 2 , and the propagations in (*) and (**) in each iteration are independent of each other. Therefore, Algorithm 5 is natively parallel on two processors, by separating the computations (*) and (**).
What differentiates Algorithms 4 and 5 is the number of anchors, rather than number of players. A more general model is that a game graph G, either one-player or two-player, has two anchors w 1 , w 2 (i.e., removing the outgoing edges of w 1 and w 2 results in an acyclic subgraph) but the precondition in Lemma 2 is not guaranteed. In such games the incorporation of two-dimensional Newton's method is still possible. Let x and y be the current estimated position values of w 1 and w 2 at each iteration, respectively. The propagated values of w 1 and w 2 in terms of x and y (e.g., if x = ) are denoted byf (x, y, w 1 ) andf (x, y, w 2 ). We solve the linear system off (x, y, w 1 ) = x andf (x, y, w 2 ) = y for x and y as the position values of w 1 and w 2 in the next iteration. Note that, however, the resulting algorithm is no longer natively parallel on two processors. The existence and uniqueness of the solution also need further investigation.
Our methods are not limited to game graphs with one or two anchors. Given a game graph with m anchors w 1 , . . . , w m (i.e., removing the outgoing edges of w 1 , . . . , w 2 results in an acyclic subgraph), we use variables x 1 , . . . , x m to denote the estimated position values of w 1 , . . . , w m , transform the problem into a system of m piecewise linear equationsf i (x 1 , . . . , x m , w i ) = x i for i = 1, . . . , m, and solve the system by incorporating m-dimensional Newton's method into retrograde analysis.
An n-player, finite, stochastic game with perfect information can be presented as a 2n-partite graph. In this direction we have further developed a retrograde approximation algorithm for multi-player stochastic games, and experimented on small versions of three-and four-player Can't Stop. See Glenn, Fang, and Kruskal (2008) for details.
Global Convergence Analysis
Our retrograde approximation algorithms presented in Subsection 4.2 perform essentially Newton iterations to find a solution to a given game graph. Newton's method is known for its rapid local convergence. When it is applied to solving a system of continuously differentiable nonlinear equations, it converges quadratically when the starting point is close enough to a solution (Dennis and Schnabel, 1996, chapter 5). We now turn to the global convergence properties of our algorithms. We show that under modest assumptions, our Algorithms 4 and 5 achieve the global convergence for one-and two-player jeopardy stochastic games, respectively. Our analysis is based on the Newton-Baluev Theorem (Ortega, 1990, section 8) . We begin with the definition of convexity.
A set Ω ⊆ R n is convex if x, y ∈ Ω implies tx − (1 − t)y ∈ Ω for t ∈ [0, 1], where the inequality is defined element-wise. A function f : R n → R m is convex on a convex set Ω if
for x, y ∈ Ω and t ∈ [0, 1]. A function f is concave if −f is convex. Note that we have used bold-face lower-case characters to denote vectors and vector functions, and subscript i to denote the ith component of a vector. We will also use bold-face upper-case characters to denote matrices.
Lemma 3 Given a differentiable function
for all x, y ∈ Ω, where J(x) is the Jacobian matrix of f at x.
Proof By (7),
The limit of the right-hand side is J(x)(y − x) as t → 1, which completes the proof. 2 Theorem 4 (Newton-Baluev Theorem) Suppose we are given a continuously differentiable function f : R n → R n which is convex on R n , and there exists a non-singular matrix C ∈ R n×n such that CJ(x) −1 ≥ 0 (i.e., all elements non-negative) for all x ∈ R n , and f (x) = 0 has a solution x * ∈ R n . Then the Newton iterations
converge to the solution x * to f (x) = 0, and the solution is unique. In addition,
Proof By Lemma 3 and (9), f (
−1 ≥ 0, we can multiply both sides of the inequality by CJ(x k ) −1 and obtain 0 ≥ −CJ(
Since the sequence Cx 1 , Cx 2 , . . . is decreasing with a lower bound Cx * , it has a limit, denoted by z. Then C −1 z is the converged value of x 1 , x 2 , . . . , which is by (9) a solution to f (x) = 0. Suppose we have two solutions x * and y * to f (x) = 0. By Lemma 3,
Multiplying both sides by CJ(x) −1 gets x * ≥ y * . Swapping the roles of x * and y * and applying Lemma 3 again, we obtain y * ≥ x * . As a result, x * = y * , so the solution is unique. 2
Note that Theorem 4 presented above is slightly different from the Newton-Baluev theorem in Ortega (1990) , section 8, where there is no constant matrix C ∈ R n×n , and it is a precondition that J(x) −1 ≥ 0 is strictly non-negative. We slightly generalized this theorem by adding C ∈ R n×n . This generalization is required to show the global convergence of Algorithm 5 for two-player jeopardy stochastic games.
Consider Algorithm 4 and Lemma 1 for one-player jeopardy stochastic games. Algorithm 4 solves the piecewise linear equationf (x, w) = x for x by Newton's method. From the proof of Lemma 1,f (x, w) is continuous, and piecewise linear in the form a(x)x + b(x), where a(x) and b(x) are piecewise constant and 0 ≤ a(x) ≤ 1. Note that since a(x) is non-increasing,f (x, w) is concave. To apply Theorem 4, we set f (x) to x −f (x, w), which is convex, and then J(x) is 1 − a(x) ≥ 0, so we do not need C (i.e., set C as 1). This problem meets the precondition of Theorem 4 except that a(x) could be equal to 1 that makes the Newton step undefined, and x −f (x, w) is piecewise linear rather than continuously differentiable. The latter issue can be addressed by replacing the sharp points by smooth approximations. For the former issue, the proof of Lemma 1 shows that a(x) > 0 if x is large enough, a(x) is non-increasing, and a(x * ) > 0. The proof of Theorem 4 shows that all the Newton iterates but the initial estimate are in the right-hand side of the solution x * . Therefore, if we start with a large enough estimate, then Algorithm 4 converges to the solution.
Consider Algorithm 5 and Lemma 2 for two-player jeopardy stochastic games. Algorithm 5 solves the system off 1 (y, w 1 ) = x andf 2 (x, w 2 ) = y for x and y by Newton's method. From the proof of Lemma 2, botĥ f 1 (y, w 1 ) andf 2 (x, w 2 ) are continuous, piecewise linear as a 1 (y)y + b 1 (y) and a 2 (x)x + b 2 (x), respectively, where a 1 (y), b 1 (y), a 2 (x), b 2 (x) are piecewise constant and 0 ≤ a 1 (y) < 1, 0 ≤ a 2 (x) ≤ 1. In addition, since a 1 (y) is non-decreasing and a 2 (x) is non-increasing,f 1 (y, w 1 ) is convex andf 2 (x, w 2 ) is concave. To apply Theorem 4, we set x to (x, y) and f (x) to (f 1 (y, w 1 ) − x, y −f 2 (x, w 2 )), which is convex. Then the Jacobian
has an upper bound smaller than 1 from the game graph. We denote it by δ, and choose C = −1 1−ǫ −1 1 , where 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 − δ is a small perturbation. As a result, C is non-singular and CJ(x) −1 ≥ 0. Therefore, this problem satisfies the precondition of Theorem 4, except thatf 1 (y, w 1 ) − x and y −f 2 (x, w 2 ) are piecewise linear rather than continuously differentiable. This issue can be addressed by replacing the sharp edges by smooth approximations. We conclude that Algorithm 5 converges for two-player jeopardy stochastic games. By Theorem 4, the converged solution is unique, which can be regarded as another proof of uniqueness of the solution.
INDEXING SCHEME
The experiments were on small versions of the game Can't Stop. The indexing schemes for one-and two-player Can't Stop are given in Subsections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
Indexing Scheme for One-Player Can't Stop
Consider one-player Can't Stop. Let x i denote the number of steps from the colored marker in column i to the end of the column. Each strongly connected component of the game graph consists of all the positions with some particular (x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x 12 ), where 0 ≤ x i ≤ 2i − 1 for i = 2, 3, . . . , 7 and 0 ≤ x i ≤ 27 − 2i for i = 7, 8, . . . , 12 and at most three of the x i are zero. ) we associate an index using a mixed radix system. The digits of the index are the x ′ i with x ′ 2 chosen as the least significant digit (this is an arbitrary choice and in fact the digits may be given in whatever order is most convenient and efficient for implementation). The values of the positions are determined by the lengths of the columns: v 2 = 1 and v i = v i−1 · (l i−1 + 1) for 2 < i ≤ 12, where l i is the length of column i. The index is then
Note that, given an index and all of the v i , it is simple to recover the x ′ i . Also, if position u within a component is reachable from position v without going through an anchor then the index of u is strictly greater than the index of v. Because of this, when we execute Algorithm 1 within a component, we can simply iterate through the positions in order of decreasing index.
With this scheme, two positions within different anchors may have the same index. However, since the position values of the non-anchor positions in a component are used only when computing the position value for the anchor in that component, the databases for the anchor positions and the non-anchor positions are maintained separately and so the duplicated indices are not a problem. In fact, we discard the database for the non-anchor positions and reconstruct them using the database for the anchor positions as necessary (as when simulating perfect play). If storage is abundant and speed is important, it would also be possible to use a file named 'x 2 x 3 . . . x 12 .ijk' to store all the position values, where i < j < k are the columns in which the markers have advanced. The offset of a position with three markers (x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x 12 ) consists of all files 'x 2 x 3 . . . x 12 . * '. The largest component is (3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 11, 9, 7, 5, 3) , which contains the position of the beginning of the game.
Indexing Scheme for Two-Player Can't Stop
We use two different indexing schemes for positions in two-player Can't Stop: one for anchors and another for non-anchors. Because we can discard the position values of non-anchors once we have computed the position value of their anchor, speed is more important than space when computing the values of non-anchors. Therefore, we use a mixed radix scheme like the one described in Section 5.1 for non-anchor positions. In this case, anchors can be described by (x 2 , . . . , x 12 , y 2 , . . . , y 12 , t) where the x i represent the positions of player one's markers, the y i represent the positions of player two's markers, and t is whose turn it is. Components are described in the same way, except that since a component includes two anchors that differ only in whose turn it is, t may be omitted when describing a component. A position within a component is (x 
Because the database for the anchors is kept, space is an important consideration when indexing anchors. In the variant used in our experiments, an anchor (x 2 , ..., x 12 , y 2 , ..., y 12 , t) is illegal if x i = y i = 0 for some i (players' markers cannot occupy the same location with a column). With this restriction many indices map to illegal anchors, for example index 14,863,564,802 corresponds to an anchor where both players have a marker in square 1 of column 2. Furthermore, once a column is closed, the locations of the markers in that column are irrelevant; only which player won matters. For example, a position u with y 2 = 3 and x 2 = 0 also represents the positions with x 2 ∈ {1, 2} and all other markers in the same places as u. If the database is stored in an array indexed using the mixed radix system as for non-anchors, then the array would be sparse: for the official game about 98% of the entries would be wasted on illegal and equivalent indices.
In order to avoid wasting space in the array and to avoid the structural overhead needed for more advanced data structures, a different indexing scheme is used that results in fewer indices mapping to illegal, unreachable, or equivalent positions. We write each position as ((x 2 , y 2 ), ..., (x 12 , y 12 ), t). Associate with each pair (x i , y i ) an index z i corresponding to its position on a list of the legal pairs of locations in column i (i.e., on a list of ordered pairs (x, y) such that x = y unless x = y = 0, and if x = l i then y = 0 and vice versa; for a column with l i = 3 this list would be (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (2, 0), (0, 2), (2, 1), (1, 2), (3, 0), (0, 3)). The z i and t are then used as digits in a mixed radix system to obtain the index
where the term in the product is the number of legal, distinct pairs of locations in column d. The list of ordered pairs used to define the z i 's can be constructed so that if component u is a supporting component of v then the indices of u's anchors are greater than the indices of v's and therefore we may iterate through the components in order of decreasing index to avoid counting children while computing the solution.
There is still redundancy in this scheme: when multiple columns are closed, what is important is which columns have been closed and the total number of columns won by each player, but not which player has won which columns. Before executing Algorithm 1 on a component, we check whether an equivalent component has already been solved. We deal with symmetric positions in the same way.
EXPERIMENTS
As proof of concept, we have solved simple versions of one-player and two-player Can't Stop. The one-player results are reported in Subsection 6.1. The two-player results are reported in Subsection 6.2. With optimal solutions, we can analyze playing strategies or heuristics for Can't Stop. A proposed heuristic analogous to the "Rule of 28" for one-player Can't Stop is examined in Subsection 6.3.
Experimental Results for One-Player Can't Stop
The simpler versions of Can't Stop use 3-, 4-, and 5-sided dice instead of 6-sided dice and may have shorter columns than the official version. Let (n, k, p) Can't Stop denote the p-player game played with four n-sided dice with the shortest column k spaces long. Columns 2 and 2n are the shortest columns and column n + 1 is the longest. Adjacent columns always differ in length by 2 spaces. The official two-player version is then (6, 3, 2) Can't Stop.
For n = 2, 3, 4, 5 and k = 1, 2, 3 (except n = 5, k = 3) we have implemented Algorithm 4 in Java and solved (n, k, 1) one-player Can't Stop. We used an initial estimate of 1.0 for the position value of each vertex. Table 1 shows, for each version of the game, the size of the game graph, the time it took the computer to solve the game, and the average number of turns needed to win the game when using the optimal strategy. The size of the game graph is given as the number of anchor vertices (i.e., vertices representing the beginning of a turn with no markers placed), and the total number of vertices in all of the anchor vertices' strongly connected components (which includes vertices representing the middle of a turn when the markers have been placed on the board). Symmetry allows us to ignore about half of the anchor vertices in our implementation since the position represented by (x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x 12 ) is equivalent to (x 12 , x 11 , . . . , x 2 ). Note that for fixed n, the time to solve the game is roughly proportional to the number of vertices. When n increases there is also an additional cost due to the increased number of outgoing edges from each vertex in U . For n = 3 there are 15 neighbors of each vertex (representing the 15 different outcomes of rolling four 3-sided dice); for n = 4 there are 35 neighbors.
The average position value also affects the running time. For larger values of k or n, the average position value is higher; higher position values will generally require more iterations in Algorithm 4 to converge. The last two columns of Table 1 show for both Newton's method and value iteration the general increase in the number of iterations per component as k and n increase (the number reported is the unweighted average). The increase is not monotonic because the important factor is the position value of each component and not the position value of the start state alone. The effect of position value can be isolated by fixing k and n. Table 2 shows how the number of iterations to converge varies with position value for (5, 1, 1) Can't Stop. Value iteration takes far more iterations than Newton's method and as a result each experiment took two to three times as long to complete with value iteration.
Experimental Results for Two-Player Can't Stop
We have implemented Algorithm 5 in Java and solved (3, k, 2) Can't Stop for k = 1, 2, 3 and also (4, 1, 2) Can't Stop. We used an initial estimate of (
2 ) for the position values of the anchors within a component. Table 3 shows, for those four versions of the game, the size of the game graph, the time it took the algorithm to run, and the probability that the first player wins assuming that each player plays optimally. The listed totals exclude the components and positions not examined because of equivalence. Note that the time to solve the game grows faster than the number of positions. This is because the running time is also dependent on the number of iterations per component, which is related to the quality of the initial estimate and the complexity of the game. Table 4 gives the average number of iterations for Newton's method versus the position value of the component given as (x, y) where x (y) is the probability that the first player wins given that the game has entered the component and it is the first (second) player's turn (the last two columns of Table 3 show that many more iterations are required by value iteration; the resulting time difference is a factor of three or four). Note that Table 4 is upper triangular because there is never an advantage in losing one's turn and symmetric because of symmetric positions within the game. Perhaps surprisingly, the components that require the most iterations are not those where the solution is farthest from the initial estimate of ( 1 2 , 1 2 ). We conjecture that this is because positions where there is a large penalty for giving up one's turn require less strategy (the decision will usually be to keep rolling) and thereforef is less complicated (has fewer pieces) and so Newton's method converges faster. There are no positions with 0 ≤ x, y < 0.2 because in a game with short columns there is always a large advantage in being the current player. Even for the simplified games, the databases are too large for a human to use without electronic access to them. We have attempted to create simpler heuristics that a human could follow for good but not optimal play.
One possible heuristic is the "Rule of 28" (Keller, 1998) . With this heuristic, each column is given a point value.
Each time a neutral marker is advanced, the point total for the turn increases by the value of the column the marker is in (double when first placing a marker in a column). Points are also added (or subtracted) for various undesirable (or desirable) combinations of columns with markers; for example 2 points are added if the three neutral markers are all in odd columns. When the point total for the turn reaches or exceeds 28, the turn ends.
Unfortunately, the Rule of 28 only addresses when to end a turn and not how to pair the dice. Furthermore, for comparison to the optimal strategy, we need to adapt it to (5, 2, 1) Can't Stop (the most complex version that we have solved). Our proposed heuristic borrows from the Rule of 28 the idea of assigning each column a fixed point value per space: for any position, the score for a column is the product of the column's value and the spaces left to advance in that column. This is intended to reflect the relative ease of completing the various columns: columns that are close to completion will have low scores. The total score for a position is the sum over all columns of the column's score times its weight, where the weights are chosen to further favor columns that are closer to completion. When we have a choice of positions to move to, we choose the one with the lowest total score.
Weights are assigned at the start of each turn so that the column with the lowest score has the highest weight. For example, the values of each column might be (11, 6, 3, 2, 1, 2, 3, 6, 11) , reflecting the fact that advancing one square in the 2's column makes much more progress to completing that column than advancing one square in the 6's column. Without the weights, the initial roll {1, 1, 5, 5} would be taken as 1 + 1 = 2 and 5 + 5 = 10 because advancing one square in the 2's and 10's columns makes 22 points of progress while advancing two squares in the 6's column makes only 2 points of progress. However, this is not the optimal move. By setting the initial weights on the columns to (1, 1, 3, 5, 12, 5, 3 , 1, 1) we change the improvement of advancing two squares in the 6's column to 24, so that becomes the chosen move. If we are ever forced to move into the 2's or 10's columns (by rolling {1, 1, 1, 1}, for example), then we re-weight those columns so they are seen as more important.
We have implemented this heuristic with the column values and weights given above. The columns are reweighted at the beginning of each turn so that the column with the lowest score is assigned weight 12, the two columns with the next lowest scores are assigned weight 5, and so forth. These values were chosen by trial and error to attempt to match the optimal move for each possible roll from the initial position of the game. The heuristic chooses the optimal first move for 54 out of 70 rolls (77.1%). Instead of ending a turn when the total value of the position has decreased by at least some fixed amount (as in the Rule of 28), we end turns only when a neutral marker is advanced to the end of a column. This rule makes the correct decision in the first turn for 90.5% of the possible positions reached in the first turn. All of the errors are from the heuristic ending a turn too soon: there are positions with markers at the end of a column where the optimal decision is to keep rolling. The average number of turns to complete the game is approximately 4.58 using this strategy versus 3.40 for the optimal strategy.
CONCLUSION
We used a bipartite graph to abstract a one-player stochastic game, and a four-partite graph to abstract a twoplayer stochastic game. For the one-player game, the goal is maximize some expected game value or to minimize the expected penalty. For the two-player game, the position values give the probability of the first player winning the game with optimal play.
We presented the family of jeopardy stochastic games that include Can't Stop, Pig, and some variants. We proved that their optimal solutions exist and are unique. We transformed the problem of finding the optimal play to a fixed point problem, and solved it by incorporating Newton's method with retrograde analysis. We called our new methods retrograde approximation algorithms, which are faster than value iteration not only in theory but also in practice. We also gave global convergence analysis of our methods.
We experimented on small versions of one-player and two-player Can't Stop, and successfully solved several simplified games with 3-sided, 4-sided, and 5-sided dice. We also compared a heuristic for (5,2,1) one-player Can't Stop to the optimal solution.
One-player Can't Stop with the official equipment has more than 6 · 10 12 positions. The official two-player game has over 10 36 components. In both cases the game so large that is would be very difficult to compute a solution. It may be possible to find patterns in the solutions to the simplified games and use those patterns to approximate optimal solutions to the official games. It may also be possible to use the optimal solution to the one-player game as an approximate solution to the two-player game.
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